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Abstract
Open source projects produce goods or standards that do not allow for the
appropriation of private returns by those who contribute to these projects. In
this paper we analyze why programmers will nevertheless invest their time
and eﬀort to code open source software. We argue that the particular way
in which open source projects are managed and especially how contributions
are attributed to individual agents, allows the best programmers to create
a signal that more mediocre programmers cannot achieve. Through setting
themselves apart they can turn this signal into monetary rewards that corre-
spond to their superior capabilities. With this incentive they will forgo the
immediate rewards they could earn in software companies producing propri-
etary software by restricting the access to the source code of their product.
Whenever institutional arrangements are in place that enable the acquisition
of such a signal and the subsequent substitution into monetary rewards, the
contribution to open source projects and the resulting public good is a feasible
outcome that can be explained by standard economic theory.
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1Who can aﬀord to do professional work for nothing? What hobbyist can put
three man-years into programming, ﬁnding all bugs, documenting his
product, and distribute for free?a
OSS poses a direct, short-term revenue and platform threat to Microsoft,
particularly in server space. Additionally, the intrinsic parallelism and free
idea exchange in OSS has beneﬁts that are not replicable with our current
licensing model and therefore present a long term developer mindshare
threat.b
aOpen Letter to Hobbyists by Bill Gates, Feb. 3rd 1976
bHalloween Memorandum I by Microsoft, Aug. 11th 1998
1 Introduction
All over the world, computers run on a variety of programs and communicate over
networks linked by protocols that are generated in the open source domain. Ever
more electronic devices like mobile phones rely on open source products and thrive
on the standards that are established by a community that not only includes single
hackers working in their leisure time but also the giants of the commercial world
like IBM and Motorola. Linux looms as its ﬂagship among other prominent success
stories such as sendmail or Apache. Linux develops operating software for almost
every electronic device and is especially successful in the market for server software:
In 2001 it had a market share of 25% compared to Microsoft Windows with a share
of 49%.1 The Linux program was originally developed by Linus Thorvalds in 1991,
then a student at Helsinki University. Its kernel was based on Unix which came in
half a dozen proprietary versions at that time. Instead of generating proprietary
software, Thorvalds made his program code accessible for other programmers and
invited them to contribute on a voluntary basis.2
That leads us to the most striking characteristic of open source software: free access
to the product and to its source code. This characteristic is legally embodied in
what is called the ’General Public License’ (GPL)3 - sometimes also referred to as
’copyleft’. Ensuring that the source code of a software program remains open, it
states that everybody may run, copy, modify and distribute the program under the
terms of the original license. Though the sale of modiﬁcations is not prohibited, the
public shall be free to access and use the original source code. Therefore the prices
of open source products beat those of their proprietary counterparts and whoever
wishes to do so can download the latest version of the product for free.4
Since no one can exercise ownership of the original product in the sense of excluding
others from the right to use it under the GPL, revenues from transferring or licensing
this right prove elusive. In turn, this implies that the community of involved code
contributors and debuggers can not claim any monetary compensation for their time
and eﬀort! Even more astonishing is the fact that yet both quantity and quality of
the contributions have such an extent that these products seriously compete with
those of software giants like Microsoft.5 Not surprisingly the phenomenon of open
source has generated a growing interest in the academic community.
1See Deutsche Bank Research (2002, p.7).
2For a more extensive description of the history of Linux, see http://www.linux.org/info.
3For the GNU General Public License see http://www.opensource.org/licenses/gpl-
license.html. A good discussion can also be found in Kaisla (2001).
4Additional services such as manuals or related service packages are sold by diﬀerent distributors
who compete mainly on service, support and training.
5See for increasing evidence Economist (2000), Economist (2001) and Economist (2002).
2At ﬁrst glance the existence and the success of open source systems (OSS) is
equally puzzling for economists and surprising for their closed source system (CSS)
competitors. They particularly marvel at the eagerness of obviously highly skilled
agents to work for free: Why would rational programmers grant their time and
skills to a non-proﬁt OSS-project instead of taking up a career in a CSS-ﬁrm like
Microsoft where they would get paid for their work?
To answer this question, the public opinion often alludes to an ideological rebellion
against commercialism and the reign of near-monopolists such as Microsoft. In the
same manner, a considerable strand of research has taken recourse to psychological
motives such as altruism and dogma. The main idea behind these propositions
is that there exists some intrinsic motivation, some sort of emotional satisfaction
harvested from unselﬁsh behavior.6 But there are also less idealistic theories, those
which refer to external rewards. Lakhani and von Hippel (2000) emphasize the
advantages of user-to-user based feedback systems and the intangible utility user-
developers extract from combining both activities. OSS programmers proﬁt both
by learning on the production side and by obtaining a better product on the con-
sumption side. The more people join this community, the higher are the individual
beneﬁts. Rapid feedback by the very best in each speciﬁc ﬁeld or project allows
for very rapid advancement along the learning curve by individual programmers.7
Another group of ideas resorts to the value of peer recognition among software
programmers. This line of reasoning argues that programmers behave as to be
appreciated by their fellows and for this purpose like to show oﬀ their abilities.
Even hobbyists, if seriously devoted to their pastime, are habitually embedded in a
community where performance is compared and acknowledged and reputations for
expertise can be earned among the like-minded.
Our approach is similar in spirit to the last one, but diﬀerent insofar as it adds
material compensations. We join works such as Lerner and Tirole (2002), John-
son (2002) and Mustonen (2003) who claim that this kind of recognition can be
transferred to the outside and moreover be translated into monetary rewards. In
this view, contributions to the program are not so much unselﬁsh donations or the
pursuit of vain self-gratiﬁcation, but rather future-oriented investments which are
based on career concerns. In the words of established economic theory, ventures in
the world of open-source are undertaken for the sake of a credible job market signal
as described by Spence (1973). How does this work?
A close inspection reveals that the OSS is organized such that every signiﬁcant
contribution can be traced back to the original author. In one of the biggest OSS-
projects, the Linux kernel, there exists a public changelog ﬁle which lists all those
programmers who have contributed to the oﬃcial source and their speciﬁc inputs.8
Naturally, not everyone makes it onto the list. Each proposal to modify the code
undergoes a peer review process and only those modiﬁcations sanctioned by the
referees make their creators legitimate authors. The authors’ names and contribu-
tions are recorded in the changelog ﬁle which is an honoring and a sign of expertise
among the programmers.9 This is where the theory of peer recognition stops, but
not the one on career concerns. For, if peer recognition theory presumes that infor-
6See Hars and Ou (2002) for some data on motivations to work for OSS-projects.
7The systemic features of the OSS are described in Raymond (2000a) where he likens the
processes of the OSS to a bazaar in contrast to the ’cathedrals’ that are crafted by proprietary
software ﬁrms with their products.
8See e.g. Moon and Sproull (2000) and Raymond (2000b).
9In the case of Linux, the changelog ﬁle portrays a pyramid-like hierarchy among the contrib-
utors. See http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.4/ChangeLog-2.4.20. The changelog ﬁle
classiﬁes diﬀerent programmer types just as there are diﬀerent kinds of contributions ranging from
documentation over debugging to more complex developing tasks. We interpret this as evidence
that any kind of programmer has the potential to signal his level of skill, but none which is higher.
3mation is revealed inside the community, why not admit that the same signal could
also reduce the information deﬁcit of people from the outside? Prerequisite for this
is the existence of some suitable and convenient mechanism to transfer the signal
beyond the domain and thus educate outsiders about the superior ability associated
with it.
In general, it seems reasonable to assume that the knowledge about skills is less
uneven among programmers than between them and outsiders. A spot in the cred-
its thus serves as a valuable signal on a job market characterized by asymmetric
information. Imagine a personnel manager faced with two candidates A and B
who claim to deserve excellent pay. Suppose both certify basic programming skills,
yet B in addition proves that he has contributed important modules to the Linux
code. Who of them is more likely to get the higher salary? If the Linux graduate
is indeed rewarded a premium, it pays oﬀ for him to have spent the eﬀort on OSS
programming.10 The ex ante expected value of the deferred pay-oﬀ makes striving
for the signal worthwhile since the unrestricted access to the Linux kernel code and
its changelog ﬁle allows for the right interpretation and honoring even by outsiders
ex post.
The signal can cross the borders of the OSS community, precisely because the
source code is open. To function well, however, it must be suﬃciently visible and
credible. Otherwise, potential employers will either not receive the signal or will not
(fully) rely on it. Consider what a signal means to them: its quality corresponds
with their willingness to pay its bearer a wage premium. In other words, the value
of the deferred pay-oﬀ depends on the properties of the emitted signal. Visibility is
achieved by a broad distribution of the product and a well-known brand. We argue
that the eﬀect of the number of OSS programmers on this criterion is signiﬁcant:
First, the number of developers raises the number of users directly. Secondly, a
higher number of developers augments the quality of the product, the acceptance of
which will therefore rise among the less sophisticated users. A possible third eﬀect,
an inter-linkage of the ﬁrst two, would be conceivable, if user-developers were mainly
avantgarde-users and industry trendsetters. The credibility of a signal grows with
the superiority of the refereeing process and the total number of proposed modi-
ﬁcations. To understand this, recall the information that a signal carries: ”This
programmer has met the standards set by the referees and has prevailed among x
modiﬁcation proposals to earn this spot in the changelog ﬁle.” Though the level of
the standards and the number of competitors are not directly observable, they are
usually implied by the quality of the product11, which in turn aﬀects the distribu-
tion and the visibility of the product. We propose that this visibility and therefore
the credibility of the signal rise with the number of programmers.12
In the previous example, a good signal would therefore evoke the following conclu-
sions in our personnel manager: ”Candidate B has drafted vital modules for the
Linux program. Linux is a prominent brand. (This is the reason why I would know
of it.) Since the product is widely known and used (especially by software experts),
it must be good. Apparently, Linux has high quality requirements and a lot of good
programmers involved. (Otherwise, the product would not be so successful.) So, if
this guy has made it into the changelog ﬁle, he must be very skilled. We should oﬀer
him an adequate salary.” On the whole, visibility and credibility, which rise with
the number of programmers in the OSS, positively aﬀect the deferred pay-oﬀs and
10Lerner and Tirole (2002) speak of a deferred pay-oﬀ.
11Consider, analogously, the inﬂuence of the competence of scouts and the number of aspiring
athletes on the level of the game e.g. in pro-basketball.
12This is obvious for the quantity of proposed modiﬁcations, but not so for the quality of the
referees. For intuition, consider how the competence of scouts will probably rise with the overall
popularity of basketball.
4thus make the signal more valuable.
By the preceding account, good programmers should altogether work and ac-
quire a signal at the OSS. If the number of programmers had only positive eﬀects, it
would be beneﬁcial to have as many OSS colleagues as possible. But additional pro-
grammers can also have negative eﬀects on their co-workers acquisition of a signal:
The story we have told is not yet complete, and the point we missed boils down to
the fact that aspirants must compete for (the limited number of) signals. To make
this case, let us ﬁrst revisit the requirement that the product be widely visible. Let
us add the observation that the product needs to be complex such that contributions
to it have the character of innovations. Otherwise there would be a limit to the skill
levels that can be demonstrated by delivering a share of the program, for simple
products require relatively simple craft. Naturally, these properties put constraints
on the nature of products suited for OSS fabrication: they characteristically need
to be sophisticated products and of wide use. Furthermore, improvements in thus
suitable products will be restricted by natural boundaries to innovation. E.g. the
number of problems one encounters in the making of operating system software is
ﬁnite in the short-term.13 Thus, given these boundaries in the set of products and
innovation, the overall stack of problems inventive programmers can pile into via
OSS is limited. As the number of programmers in OSS increases, more and more
will start to cross paths and embark on the same technical questions. Since only
one solution will make its way into the oﬃcial code, they will begin to compete
for spots in the changelog ﬁle. The winner-takes-it-all principle driven by the peer
review process will make it increasingly diﬃcult for any one of them to stand out.
Thus, in sum, each programmer in the OSS exerts a positive and a negative exter-
nality on his peers. His participation increases the value of the signal, but at the
same time decreases the probability of obtaining one! We will therefore model the
expected value of the deferred payoﬀ such that it ﬁrst rises and then falls in the
number of OSS programmers.14
Evidently, the hitherto sketched mechanism would only induce programmers
to an OSS career, if the discounted expected deferred pay-oﬀ were higher than
the expected wage in a CSS-ﬁrm. But why would we presume that CSS-ﬁrms do
not diﬀerentiate wages after the ﬁrst year of employment or so, for, if they did,
little would remain of the OSS’ attractiveness? One important reason is that, in
the absence of an OSS, there is no incentive to do so. Why should the CSS-ﬁrm
concede to its employees a signal, which enables them to market themselves to
outside ﬁrms? Once they have it, they could threaten to leave the ﬁrm in order to
renegotiate their salary. Should there be a supply shortage on the labor market, the
ﬁrm would have to give in, lest it would lose its most able programmers. Thus, the
CSS-ﬁrms’ best strategy would be not to grant such a signal in the ﬁrst place. In
the presence of an OSS, a CSS-ﬁrm can react in two ways: On the one hand, if the
provoked drain of programmers were negligible, so might the incentive to change
the wage structure. On the other hand, if the threat were considerable, more eﬀort
might be undertaken to diﬀerentiate wages. There is nowadays indicative evidence
of CSS-ﬁrms’ attempts to emulate OSS-like production and reward structures.15 It
is not clear, however, where this will take them.
13Even if additional programmers were to discover new problems, the marginal rate of growth
in the number of problems would certainly be declining in the number of programmers.
14See Mustonen (2003) for a diﬀerent model of the expected payoﬀ function.
15Microsoft introduced a philosophy called ’Shared Source’ under which terms it grants diﬀer-
ent users some insights into the source code of its Windows operating system. HewlettPackard
introduced ’Corporate Source’ to reap some beneﬁts of the processes at work in the OSS.
5In essence, we argue that a signalling mechanism is at work for those who con-
tribute to an open-source product that is distributed for free. In contrast to that,
the restriction of an undisclosed source-code in a traditional software ﬁrm necessar-
ily limits the transparency concerning individual contributions, resulting in a more
levelled wage for programmers of diﬀerent productivity. As a consequence, under
certain circumstances some high potentials might prefer to invest their resources in
an OSS-project. We aim to show the conditions for such a result in a model in this
article.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the basic model. An equilibrium
analysis is undertaken in section 3 before in section 4 the equilibria are further
analyzed in a comparative statics way for the eﬀect that changes in important
parameters can have. Implications of our model are brieﬂy discussed in section 5,
whereas section 6 oﬀers some possible extensions to our model.
2 The model
2.1 The programmers
We assume
1. a total population of n programmers consisting of nA programmers of type A
and nB programmers of type B. That is,
n = nA + nB.
2. that type A generates an output of qA, type B produces qB, while eﬀort levels
are constant and costs of eﬀort are equal for both types, so that there is no
moral hazard. By assumption,
qA > qB.
3. the information regarding his type is private knowledge for each agent. Thus,
the labor market is subject to asymmetric information. It is also characterized
by excess demand, i.e. in principle, its demand-side institutions can and would
absorb all programmers.
4. the programmers are risk-neutral and completely patient, i.e. they have a
discount factor of one.
2.2 The institutions
In our model we distinguish two types of institutional arrangements that software
production can take and between whom all programmers have to make career choice:
an open-source system (OSS) and a closed-source system (CSS). Both possible sys-
tems are stylized as having an identical production function and a diﬀerent remu-
neration method.
2.2.1 The production function
We assume
1. the two institutional arrangements possess identical production functions which
are speciﬁed as the sum of the individual productivities of all programmers
working for a representative ﬁrm or project in the respective system. This
6additive production technology employs human capital as the sole production
factor and is a function which is homogenous of degree one. Therefore, the
marginal return of one additional programmer always equates his individual
productivity qi (qA or qB). Formally, this production function can be stated
as follows
Qj =
n
j
X
i=1
qi = n
j
AqA + n
j
BqB for j = OSS,CSS (2.1)
where n
j
A and n
j
B represent the number of type A and B programmers in the
respective system. If we denote the fraction of nA working for the CSS with α
(where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1) and the fraction of nB working for the CSS with β (where
0 ≤ β ≤ 1), then the production functions for the respective system can be
rewritten as
QCSS = αnAqA + βnBqB
QOSS = (1 − α)nAqA + (1 − β)nBqB.
2. Qj denotes the aggregate output in a representative ﬁrm in the CSS or a
particular project in the OSS. It can be interpreted as the quality of the
software product and its thereof derived degree of distribution among users.
In the case of the CSS, we equate QCSS to the revenues earned by the sale of
its products. In the case of the OSS, where no proceeds are reapt, QOSS is a
proxy for its visibility and credibility.
2.2.2 The wage function (CSS)
While having the same production function, the two institutions are substantially
diﬀerent in terms of remuneration. The CSS uses the proceeds to pay wages to the
programmers, whereas the OSS lacks those proceeds. At the OSS, programmers
work for free and receive - if anything at all - a signal which is rewarded in monetary
terms only in later periods.
We assume
1. a CSS-ﬁrm cannot (or does not want to) distinguish between the two types
of programmers as it has no access to a suﬃciently eﬀective or inexpensive
screening technology.
2. outstanding performance during a CSS career does not lead to higher wages.
The closed-source technology implies certain limits to the transparency on dif-
ferent programmers’ contributions so that the individual output is not publicly
observable or veriﬁable. Though a type A programmer can demonstrate his
programming skills within a particular company, the CSS-ﬁrm initially has no
incentive to grant him a signal which could be used to seek a better paid job
somewhere else. With no such signal at hand, any outside company would at
best oﬀer him some pooling wage, leaving him no better oﬀ. Therefore he is
not in the position to threaten termination of his contract. Knowing this, the
ﬁrm has no incentive to increase his wage.
3. the CSS chooses the wage level as to realize zero proﬁts.
Our assumptions imply that the earnings equal to QCSS are shared evenly among
all CSS programmers. Everyone gets the same wage
w(α,β) =
QCSS
nCSS =
αnAqA + βnBqB
αnA + βnB
(2.2)
7with nCSS denoting the total number of programmers working for the representative
CSS-ﬁrm. The sum of the wages always equals the total output QCSS for any given
level of α or β. The following ﬁgure illustrates the relationship between the fraction
of type A and type B which join the CSS and the wage they get consequently.
Figure 1: The wage function
2.2.3 The deferred pay-oﬀ function (OSS)
Programmers at the OSS are not paid wages, but can earn signals which indicate
their productivity. The value of such a signal is the discounted value of the result-
ing deferred pay-oﬀ. Since it cannot be earned with certainty, programmers must
calculate their beneﬁts on the basis of expected values: namely the value of the
associated deferred pay-oﬀ weighted with the probability of obtaining a signal.16
We assume that
1. the value of the deferred pay-oﬀ associated with a signal is positively related
to the signal’s visibility and credibility, which QOSS is a proxy for. According
to equation 2.1, QOSS rises with nOSS. The logic is as follows: The more
programmers cooperate, the better will the joint product be. The better the
product is, the larger will its distribution be. And the more prominent the
product is, the more visible and credible will the signal be.
2. the probability of obtaining a signal is negatively correlated with the degree
of competition among programmers. We assume competition to be a function
also of nOSS. As more programmers join, it gets increasingly diﬃcult to earn
a place in the changelog ﬁle. The likelihood that a software problem draws
more than one solver rises, while chances to be in the ranks of those whose
solutions have worked their way into the oﬃcial source code drop.17
16Note that the assumption of risk-neutrality and complete patience on the part of our agents
allows us to treat discounted expected deferred pay-oﬀ as if it were neither uncertain nor deferred.
For reasons of brevity, we will often omit the attributes ’expected’ and ’discounted’, while keeping
the ’deferred’ to indicate that programmers work for free during their time at an OSS-project.
Dropping the assumption of risk-neutrality would alter our results to the extent that ceteris paribus
only the less risk-averse type A programmers would ponder and possibly embark upon an OSS
career. Leaving aside the assumption of complete patience would decrease the present value of the
expected signal, thus making the OSS career less attractive.
17See Appendix A.1 for an exemplary formal treatment of the competition eﬀect.
83. combining the two eﬀects described in (1) and (2) results in the following shape
of the deferred pay-oﬀ function: its value ﬁrst rises and then falls over nOSS.
Gradually, the competition eﬀect oﬀsets and later outgrows the visibility ef-
fect. At suﬃciently high levels of nOSS, the value will approach zero. When
approximating the function, we will assume a level k of nOSS at which the
value actually is zero. k can then be understood as a proxy for the innovative
potential of the industry.18
4. the value of the deferred pay-oﬀ is also dependant on exogenous mechanisms
that allow for the transfer of information and the willingness of outside com-
mercial ﬁrms to pay a premium for the signal. Risk-averse principals faced
with asymmetric information on the labor market are prepared to pay a pre-
mium for the revelation of the type.19 Furthermore, we assume that such a
premium will potentially only be paid for type A whose productivity is higher
and that the maximum pay-oﬀ obtainable for type B is thus bounded by his
productivity. We subsume these elements into the non-negative parameter vi,
whereby vB ≤ qB.
5. the deferred pay-oﬀ functions are separate ones for type A and type B, because
the changelog ﬁle eﬀectively classiﬁes the programmers’ productivity. That
is, the peer review process of the OSS prevents type B from imitating type
A. Therefore, for a given programmer, competition is dependent only on the
number of rival programmers from the same type.20
Assumptions (1)-(4) imply that there exists a unique maximum at which the
value of the deferred pay-oﬀ equals vi. On the basis of (5) we specify separate,
independent functions for type A and B. We approximate them by using quadratic
functions of the following form:21
rA(α) = −
4n2
AvA
k2
A
[α − (1 −
kA
2nA
)]2 + vA (2.3)
rB(β) = −
4n2
BvB
k2
B
[β − (1 −
kB
2nB
)]2 + vB (2.4)
In 2.3 and 2.4, α and β are the independent variables. The parameter ki denotes the
absolute number of type i programmers at the OSS for which the relevant functions
assume the value of zero due to excessive competition. E.g. the expected deferred
pay-oﬀ value for type A equals zero if nOSS
A = nA(1 − α) = kA (equivalent to
α = 1 − kA
nA). Obviously, for α = 1 function 2.3 is also zero. The same analysis
applies to kB and β.
The parameter vi is related to the individual productivity qi of the programmers
and furthermore captures the existence and quality of the surrounding markets and
the willingness of commercial ﬁrms to honor the acquired signal. vi determines
the maximum value of the achievable deferred pay-oﬀ for the two types, whereas
(1 − ki
2ni) are the α and β values for which the functions reach this maximum.
Figure 2 illustrates the functions 2.3 and 2.4.
18The logic behind this is as follows: The innovative potential can be interpreted as the number
of problems to be solved by innovations. The smaller this number, the more likely will programmers
cross paths and competition will be higher. Thus, if the innovative potential is low, the competition
eﬀect sets in faster and will eliminate the visibility eﬀect earlier. Hence, k will be low. Notice
that the dimension of k is equal to that of the absolute number of programmers n. See also
Appendix A.1 and the impact of the parameter m therein.
19The booming headhunting business shows that this is not an unrealistic assumption.
20Although the competition eﬀects for the two types are independent (and therefore imply
separate functions), the visibility eﬀect is not. Thus, the deferred pay-oﬀ functions would be
separate, but not wholly independent. We will, however, model independent functions for reasons
of simplicity.
21See Appendix A.2 for the derivation of the function.
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Figure 2: The deferred pay-oﬀ function
So far we have outlined the basic framework of our model. Its elements are
the two types of programmers and the two institutional settings with identical
production but diﬀerent remuneration functions, one paying wage and the other
yielding an expected deferred pay-oﬀ. Together, these elements sketch the decision
problem which lies at the heart of our model. In the following section, we will
formally analyze this decision problem for each type.
3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 Conditions for the existence and stability of equilibria
We will not undertake an elaborate study of all possible coordination games between
programmers in this paper and leave all the dynamic aspects that these provoke to
follow-up works. In this paper, we assume that α and β are known with certainty.
We proceed from the assumption that the eﬀects of individual programmers on the
given α or β are inﬁnitesimal. A single agent therefore presumes that his decision
will not aﬀect the overall distribution and thus act as a price-taker with regard to w
or r. An assumption that would lead to the same outcome is myopia by the agents
such that they have no information about either of the global population parame-
ters nA, nB, α or β. They neither know the complete shape of the remuneration
functions nor their position on it, but observe only the locally given w and r. Both
sets of assumptions sensibly rule out strategic considerations and result in a static
optimization problem where agents act solely upon the observed values of w and r.
We deﬁne a static equilibrium as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 A static equilibrium is a situation that is characterized by no inherent
tendency for change. Whenever small deviations in the variables occur, equilibrium
is restored.
Equilibrium is the aggregate outcome of individual decisions of type A and
type B agents. To analyze the decision of the individual programmers we use the
10following diﬀerence functions:
∆A(α) = w(α,β) − rA(α) (3.1)
∆B(β) = w(α,β) − rB(β)
They represent the rationale of a single programmer of the respective type choos-
ing between an OSS and a CSS career taking the values of α and β as given. A
programmer will opt for the CSS, if the value of the diﬀerence function is positive,
thus, whenever w > r. Conversely, the OSS will be preferred, if the value of the
diﬀerence function is negative, i.e. if w < r. Programmers are indiﬀerent between
the two career paths whenever the value of the diﬀerence function is zero.
Even though the inﬂuence of a single agent is just minuscule, the overall distri-
bution de facto results from the sum of all individual choices. For further analysis,
we deﬁne a gravitation ﬁeld as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 A positive (negative) ∆A establishes a positive (negative) gravitation
ﬁeld and α will tend to increase (decrease). The same holds true for β and ∆B.
Interior solutions For an interior solution to be an equilibrium two conditions
must be fulﬁlled: Naturally, the necessary condition is the existence of an interior
solution. For this, the programmers must be indiﬀerent between the two career
paths for a certain value of α∗ and β∗. This implies that the diﬀerence function
must have a value of zero, i.e. that the following conditions are met:
w(α,β) = rA(α) (3.2)
w(α,β) = rB(β)
In addition to that, there must be a tendency to restore α∗ or β∗ in case of small
deviations, which requires the following, suﬃcient condition, to be met: There must
be a positive gravitation ﬁeld to the left and a negative gravitation ﬁeld to the right
of α∗ or β∗. In this case 3.2 satisﬁes our deﬁnition of an equilibrium.
Corner solutions In addition to the interior solutions, the right-hand corner
solutions α = 1 and β = 1 as well as the left-hand corner solutions α = 0 and
β = 0 represent potential equilibria. The necessary and suﬃcient condition for the
right-hand corner solutions to be equilibria is that there is a positive gravitation
ﬁeld to its left. Accordingly, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the left-hand
corner solutions to be equilibria is that there is a negative gravitation ﬁeld to its
right.
To summarize, we illustrate the point graphically with Figure 3 which shows the
diﬀerence function for type A.
3.2 The decision of type B
Lemma 1 All type B programmers join the CSS.
Proof: We insert equations 2.2 and 2.4 into 3.1 and get
∆B =
αnA(qA − vB) + βnB(qB − vB)
αnA + βnB
+
4n2
BvB
k2
B
[β − (1 −
kB
2nB
)]2 ≥ 0
(3.3)
11Figure 3: The diﬀerence function
Since the productivity of type B programmers is the upper bound which
the market is willing to attribute to them, the diﬀerence function can
never be negative for type B programmers.22 Although there is a spe-
cial case in which the parameters have values that result in ∆B = 0 and
the agents are indiﬀerent between an OSS and a CSS career, this inte-
rior solution strictly features a positive gravitation ﬁeld to its right and
thereby violates our stability criterium. It is therefore not an equilib-
rium. The only viable equilibrium, which fulﬁls our stability conditions,
is the right-hand corner solution. Consequently, type B programmers
will always opt for the CSS. 2
Whenever the possibility of an employment by the closed source system exists,
type B programmers will join this system.23 Therefore, we restrict ourselves in the
following analysis to the case where β = 1. Equation 2.2 can be rewritten as
w(α) = qB +
nA(qA − qB)
nB + αnA
· α for β = 1 (3.4)
The wage function for type A given that all type B programmers join the CSS can
then be illustrated graphically as in Figure 4.24
22This statement holds true, even if we allow for non-independent deferred pay-oﬀ functions as
explained under fn. 20.
23This result could be disputed on empirical grounds: There seem to be less skilled programmers
involved e.g. at Linux. We suggest two possible responses. First, we believe that they are dif-
ferently motivated than our career-concerned investors and that their presence does by no means
have a negative eﬀect on our investors. If anything, they are highly welcome since they provide
valuable debugging. Franck and Jungwirth (2002), in fact, argue that in OSS both groups co-exist
in symbiosis without crowding each other out. Secondly, we believe that, notwithstanding the ﬁrst
critique, in reality many low-end tasks with regard to open source products (e.g. documentation,
maintenance, servicing) are performed in CSS-ﬁrms which accompany the OSS-project like satel-
lites. It is very much as if the OSS were outsourcing unspectacular tasks, a phenomenon which
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Figure 4: The wage function for β = 1
3.3 The decision of type A
In the following we will analyze the decision of type A, starting with their choice in
the absence of any type B programmers before establishing the results for the case
that both types are present.
Lemma 2 If nB were zero, all type A programmers would join the CSS.
Proof: If there were no type B programmers, the CSS wage would be qA
at all times. For nB = 0, equation 2.2 yields w = qA and the diﬀerence
function for type A reads
∆A = (qA − vA +
4n2
AvA
k2
A
[α − (1 −
kA
2nA
)]2 ≥ 0. (3.5)
In this special case with only one type of agent, ﬁrms are not at risk of
employing a ’lemon’. No value is obtained by signalling and no rationally
acting ﬁrm is ready to attribute a premium beyond the productivity of
type A. In this special case vA is bounded by qA and ∆A is always
non-negative. From the non-negativity of the ∆-function it follows that
α = 1 is the only stable solution. 2
Lemma 3 For nB > 0, the necessary condition for a type A programmer to join
the OSS is that the premium attributed to type A, vA, is higher than the productivity
of type B, qB, which is also the CSS minimum wage.
could easily be explained by our result.
24One could argue that, if all type B programmers choose the CSS, participation in the OSS is
already suﬃcient to signal the type to outside employers -without recourse on the changelog ﬁle.
There are, however, two explanations which disqualify sole participation in an OSS as a signal:
Firstly, it would enable bad programmers to imitate good ones. In fact, the separation in Lemma
1 would collapse. Secondly, in practice, any OSS programmer remains invisible until he is revealed
by the changelog ﬁle.
13Proof: After substituting 2.2 and 2.3 into 3.1 for type A, we obtain
∆A =
αnA(qA − vA) + βnB(qB − vA)
αnA + βnB
+
4n2
AvA
k2
A
[α − (1 −
kA
2nA
)]2
where the second addend is non-negative. The sign of the ﬁrst addend
is dependent on the relation between vA and the productivities qi.
Since Lemma 1 established the fact that β = 1 the above equation can
be rewritten to
∆A = qB − vA +
αnA(qA − qB)
αnA + nB
+
4n2
AvA
k2
A
[α − (1 −
kA
2nA
)]2. (3.6)
The last two addends are always non-negative and only the ﬁrst can
have a negative value within our deﬁnition space. ∆A can only assume
a negative sign if vA exceeds qB to a suﬃcient degree. qB is the lower
bound of the wage function and vA represents the maximum value the
deferred pay-oﬀ function can ever assume, qB < vA is thus a minimum
condition for the signalling mechanism to work. 2
Lemma 4 For nB > 0 and vA > qB, there are parameter constellations which allow
for a non-positive value of the diﬀerence function, which is the suﬃcient condition
for a type A programmer to join the OSS.
Proof: To prove Lemma 4, we choose the following parameter constel-
lation:
kA = 2nA vA = qA
Equation 3.6 simpliﬁes to
∆A = qB − vA +
αnA(qA − qB)
αnA + nB
+ qAα2
α = 0 results in ∆(0) = qB −vA which is less than zero, if the necessary
condition identiﬁed by Lemma 3 holds. 2
3.4 Aggregate outcome
Lemmata 1 to 4 imply
Proposition 1 The CSS exists in any case. The co-existence of an OSS is possible
only under certain parameter constellations.
The parameter-dependent structure and stability of the equilibria determine at what
ratio the type A population can split up between the CSS and the OSS.
Corollary 1 Some parameter settings establish a separating equilibrium as feasible.
Proof: This follows directly from Lemma 4. 2
A separating equilibrium is instated, when some type A agents rationally choose to
forgo a wage in search for a signal that sets them apart from type B. Some settings
even constitute a separating equilibrium, in which all type A programmers join the
OSS. The last case is shown by the fact that ∆(0) ≤ 0 can be obtained as a result
for certain parameter constellations. Note that the existence of multiple equilibria
is possible. However, the exact coordination by which an equilibrium is reached is
not modelled here.
14Corollary 2 Even if a separating equilibrium is feasible, it is not necessarily es-
tablished. A pooling equilibrium is always a rival option.
Proof: For all parameter constellations ∆(1) > 0 by deﬁnition. Recall
that r(1) = 0 and w(1) > 0. That is, the right-hand corner solution is
always a possible equilibrium outcome. 2
In a pooling equilibrium, all programmers regardless of their type work for the CSS.
So far, we have shown that the number of equilibria depends on the parameter
constellation. We pursue this line of thought in a comparative static analysis high-
lighting the eﬀect of the parameters nA
kA and vA in particular. Furthermore, we will
look at what happens if the zero-proﬁt condition for the CSS is dropped allowing
it to set its wage arbitrarily.
4 Comparative statics
4.1 Analysis with respect to the population parameters
In the following we will analyze how the outcome is aﬀected if changes in the
population parameters k and n occur. We assume that type A is rewarded with
a premium by the market that exactly equals his productivity, i.e. in this section
vA = qA holds. As shown by Lemma 1, β = 1 . Although the dimension of k indeed
renders it a population parameter, we will refer to it as the proxy for the industry’s
innovative potential.25
4.1.1 Equilibria
Lemma 5 The number of equilibria depends on the relation between the number of
type A programmers and the absolute number of programmers for which the deferred
pay-oﬀ function assumes a value of zero, i.e. on nA
kA .
Proof: See Appendix A.3. 2
We can distinguish three cases:
• CASE (A) If
nA
kA
<
1
2
(1 −
r
1 −
qB
qA
),
only the right-hand corner solution is an equilibrium. Given a certain inno-
vative potential in the industry, the number of type A programmers is yet
insuﬃcient to sustain an OSS project as its overall quality would not provide
their signal with enough visibility and credibility. The CSS exists alone.
• CASE (B) If
1
2
(1 −
r
1 −
qB
qA
) ≤
nA
kA
<
1
2
(1 +
r
1 −
qB
qA
),
both corner solutions represent possible equilibria. The number of type A
programmers relative to the industry’s innovative potential is so large that
the deferred pay-oﬀs would exceed the pooling wage, if enough type A pro-
grammers created an OSS. At the same time, the population is yet too small
for an excessive competition eﬀect to press the expected value of the deferred
pay-oﬀ back below the wage level. An OSS is a feasible outcome.
25Compare fn. 18.
15• CASE (C) If
1
2
(1 +
r
1 −
qB
qA
) ≤
nA
kA
,
the diﬀerence function has two roots of which the left hand one is an equilib-
rium. It joins the right-hand corner solution as a possible outcome. The type
A population is now so large relative to the industry’s innovative potential
that with decreasing α, from a certain threshold on, the expected value of the
deferred pay-oﬀ again slips beneath the wage oﬀered at the CSS. Due to this
competition eﬀect, the two remuneration functions now intersect twice.
Figure 5 illustrates the three cases graphically.
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Figure 5: Changes in the population parameters
Note that the lower boundary condition of case (B) is the necessary condition
for a forking of projects. It denotes a critical mass in the population of type A
needed for an OSS-project to possibly subsist. Lemma 5 implies
Proposition 2 Given a well-developed information transfer mechanism (vA = qA),
an OSS can only emerge, if the type A population is suﬃciently large relative to the
industry’s innovative potential.
Note that the above proposition only denotes a necessary condition for the pos-
sibility and the sustainability of an OSS . Whether and when an OSS will actually
come into existence remains unanswered by this analysis.
4.1.2 OSS threshold and trigger
Even though the unique intersection between wage and deferred pay-oﬀ in case (B)
and the right intersection in case (C) yield a value of zero for the ∆-function, these
points are no sustainable equilibria. Nevertheless, they play a signiﬁcant role, since
they represent a critical threshold. Once α falls below this threshold, the industry
is drawn away from the monopoly situation where all work for the CSS. Instead a
duopoly structure of the industry is established where type A programmers can dis-
tinguish themselves from the type B programmers and thereby signal their superior
productivity. Any event or action that pushes α across this threshold, triggers oﬀ
the establishment of a sustainable OSS. Any analysis of such trigger events aims at
answering the above questions of whether and when an OSS emerges.26 We propose
that the closer the threshold is to α = 1, the more likely is a trigger event.
26E.g. Franck and Jungwirth (2002) consider ideologically motivated donators as those who
trigger oﬀ the emergence of OSS.
164.1.3 Discussion and practical relevance: evolutionary potential of in-
dustry
In our model, the eﬀect of nA and kA should always be analyzed in combination.
Consider e.g. the following extreme cases:
1. With kA approaching zero in the limit, the deferred pay-oﬀ curve approximates
the function α = 1. This also makes sense intuitively: Given there were no
room for innovation, who could set himself apart by innovation? No matter
how large the population of workers in that industry were, an OSS would not
emerge. For this reason, mature industries will seldom witness open source
business models.
2. Conversely, consider kA very high, but nA verging on zero. Despite a high
innovative potential, there could be too few good programmers in the industry
to create a prestigious open source project. In the extreme case of nA = 0,
only one type of programmer would remain eliminating the need for signalling
(and thus an OSS) regardless of kA.
Diﬀerent constellations of the population parameter nA
kA can signify various evo-
lutionary stages within one industry or characteristics of diﬀerent industries. In
principle, the emergence of an OSS is driven by the desire of the better-skilled
programmers to emit a signal to set themselves apart from the less productive pro-
grammers. However, our analysis shows that such a development is contingent on
the industry’s room for innovation as well as on the number of people who can tap
and exploit this potential.
The analysis of nA
kA oﬀers yet another interesting aspect. Let us assume nA and kA
are suﬃciently large. As the industry grows and a present OSS-project becomes
too small to accommodate all good programmers, an extension of projects within
an OSS may lead to a higher kA or more OSS-projects may emerge and expand
into other areas of software programming. These projects might even compete as to
which one owns the better signalling mechanism. We perceive two balancing forces
at work: On the one hand, an increasing population of good programmers will raise
the need for diﬀerentiation and, in turn, the number, scale and scope of the OSS.
On the other hand, whenever a good and successful OSS-project is established the
incentive for the programmers to take this project private and place some copyright
on its product gets stronger. Some projects start on a small scale in the OSS, but
may at some point turn into private ventures.
Which structure will the industry settle on in the long-run? Our guess is that, even
though a CSS mono-existence is always feasible, as long as credible and transferable
job market signals can be gained by innovation, i.e. evolutionary potential is high,
the industry will likely oscillate around equilibria with multiple systems - open and
closed.
4.2 The importance of information transfer mechanisms
4.2.1 Equilibria
In the preceding paragraph the maximum deferred payoﬀ obtainable for the type
A programmers was assumed to equal their productivity qA. Now we return to
the analysis of the general case where the maximum deferred pay-oﬀ is not preset
to the individual productivity. To concentrate on the eﬀect of a change in vA, we
assume in this section with a slight loss in generality that the absolute number
of programmers for which the deferred pay-oﬀ function has a value of zero - kA -
would equal the population of type A programmers, i.e. kA = nA. The reputation
17function for type A then simpliﬁes to
rA(α) = −4vA[α −
1
2
]2 + vA.
With this function, deferred payoﬀ will be zero for an α of either zero or one and
the maximum remuneration value that can be gained by working for the OSS will
be reached if the population of good programmers exactly splits up between the
CSS and the OSS.
Depending on the value of vA there exists either just one equilibrium for α = 1 or a
situation with two possible equilibria: the CSS-only outcome and a mixed outcome
with both CSS and OSS in place. Starting with a low vA any increase in vA will
ﬁrst establish intersections between the wage curve and the deferred pay-oﬀ function
and then shift the intersections to the extremes. The right-hand intersection of the
wage and deferred pay-oﬀ function is an instable saddle point and represents the
threshold separating the gravitation ﬁelds of the other two equilibria (the right-hand
corner solution with solely CSS to the right and the mixed outcome to the left).
Figure 6 illustrates three cases with an increasing vA graphically.
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Figure 6: Changes in the institutional parameters
Our analysis leads us to
Proposition 3 The co-existence of OSS and CSS is only a viable equilibrium if the
institutional environs (or market surroundings) allow OSS programmers to credibly
transfer a signal to the market. The higher the valuation of the market for out-
standing performance in the OSS, the more likely is a shift from mono-existence of
CSS to a mixed equilibrium.
4.2.2 Discussion and practical relevance: the rise of information trans-
fer mechanisms
A low value for vA indicates a non-existent or insuﬃciently developed market mech-
anism to remunerate signals gained in the OSS. The markets in which the OSS is
embedded need good information ﬂows to substitute future rewards for such signals.
The emergence of the internet provided more transparency, as a better transmission
of information became possible. This eﬀect is captured by an increase in vA.
Graphically, this means that the parable shifts upwards and, at some point in time,
intersects with the wage graph. The stable, left-hand equilibrium and the instable,
right-hand intersection are established. Any further increase in the quality and
accuracy with which the market takes the information about the work of type A
programmers into account shifts the intersections to the extremes - lowering the
threshold for leaving the CSS and facilitating the emergence of OSS.
Not only these benign eﬀects of markets caused by the technological advances in in-
formation processing lead to a lower threshold, but also any mis-pricing that might
18occur in times of a bubble economy: Akin to the dot.com bubble up to the year 2000
in the sector of Technology, Media and Telecommunications (TMT) and the subse-
quent over-investment in resources in these areas, the over-shooting of the market
also led to an over-investment in open-source projects and possibly over-pricing of
high-potential IT specialists. In our model, an overshooting of the valuation for
OSS programmers represented by a value of vA > qA can have two reasons: On
the one hand, ﬁrms oﬀering career opportunities for OSS programmers might have
a speciﬁc production function which employs the signals of their employees as one
production factor, resulting in additional proﬁts generated by the mere fact that
programmers of high reputation are associated with the company. An example for
this is Linus Thorvalds who now works for Transmeta, an internet startup develop-
ing low-power microprocessors in an OSS-like development process.27 On the other
hand it may well be possible, that potential employers of OSS programmers form
overshooting beliefs about the productivity of these agents. Such uncertainty or
overshooting has the eﬀect of triggering new OSS projects more easily as individual
programmers try to exploit the trade-oﬀ between the visibility and the competition
eﬀect. As the hype and overshooting ebbed away, many of these promising projects
were quietly cancelled.28
4.3 Strategic wage setting
We initially assumed that a representative ﬁrm in the CSS sets its wage level so that
it makes no proﬁts. In this section we drop this assumption to see what happens if
the CSS can change the level of payment to its employees. We still stick with the
assumption that there is a uniform wage for all programmers employed by the CSS.
The pooling wage w may now be freely set and varied. We also assume a parameter
constellation that allows for two intersections of the wage curve and the deferred
pay-oﬀ function. To simplify, we assume kA = nA in our formal analysis.
The former wage curve serves as a benchmark. With this wage function given by
equation 2.2, proﬁts for the CSS are always zero. We denote this case by w0. In
contrast to that, we deﬁne arbitrary wage as the actual wage that the CSS pays all
of its employees and denote it by ¯ w.
The minimum arbitrary wage that a CSS-ﬁrm can pay its employees equals the
minimum value of the zero-proﬁt wage: ¯ wmin = w0
min = qB. Figure 7 shows us four
diﬀerent arbitrary wage levels ( ¯ wmin to ¯ w3). For each wage level, we get diﬀerent
points of intersection between ¯ wj and rA. The lower the wage level is, the farther
apart are the intersections other things being equal. ¯ w3 clearly shows that once ¯ wj
surpasses the maximal reputation vA, there is only the CSS-only equilibrium for
α = 1. Increasing the wage level reduces the proﬁt zone, i.e. the range between
α = 1 and the intersection between ¯ w and w0.
The sequence of events is as follows: (1) The CSS arbitrarily chooses a wage ¯ w. (2)
This wage level determines the equilibria, (3) which in turn imply the respective
level of proﬁt for the CSS-ﬁrm. We follow this thread in our analysis.
4.3.1 Equilibria
Imagine the CSS sets an arbitrary wage ¯ w. Programmers make their decision on
the basis of this wage. The diﬀerence function therefore incorporates ¯ w instead of
w0. The same holds true for the condition for an interior solution which turns into:
¯ w = rA.
27See http://www.transmeta.com for more details.
28See http://www.sourceforge.net for a listing of inactive projects.
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Figure 7: Strategic wage setting
Lemma 6 Decreasing the wage by the CSS increases its proﬁts. Any decrease in
the wage level, however, moves the threshold closer to the CSS-only equilibrium,
thereby increasing the chance for an OSS to be triggered.
Proof: In the symmetric case of kA = nA, substituting 2.3 into the
above equation yields:
¯ w = −4vA[α −
1
2
]2 + vA
Solving this equation for α gives us the following interior solutions for
the redeﬁned diﬀerence function:
α∗
1 =
1
2
−
r
vA − ¯ w
4vA
α∗
2 =
1
2
+
r
vA − ¯ w
4vA
As can clearly be seen, we get no solutions for ¯ w > vA. For qB ≤
¯ w ≤ vA, the eﬀect which ¯ w has on the positions of the equilibria can be
summarized by
∂α∗
1
∂ ¯ w
> 0 and
∂α∗
2
∂ ¯ w
< 0
For increasing ¯ w the right-hand intersection travels to the left, while the
left-hand intersection (and equilibrium) goes to the right. They meet
comprising a tangency point for ¯ w = vA . After that, no intersection
exists. Conversely, decreasing ¯ w augments the distance between α∗
1 and
α∗
2. 2
The CSS is able to inﬂuence the position of the equilibrium outcome where both
a CSS and an OSS exist. This allows a determination of the size of the gravitation
ﬁelds of the two equilibria. E.g. decreasing the wage level enlarges the negative
gravitation ﬁeld between the two intersection points at the expense of the outer
ﬁelds.
204.3.2 Equilibrium proﬁt
Only the interior solution α∗
1 is a possible equilibrium besides the CSS-only outcome
for the corner solution of α = 1. We therefore have two potential settings for any
arbitrary wage level below vA and can calculate the CSS proﬁt per programmer for
the two cases by
π1( ¯ w) = w0(1) − ¯ w
π2( ¯ w) = w0(α∗
1) − ¯ w
Total proﬁt is then calculated by
Π1( ¯ w) = [w0(1) − ¯ w] · (nA + nB)
Π2( ¯ w) = [w0(α∗
1) − ¯ w] · (α∗
1nA + nB)
Since α∗
1 is itself a function of ¯ w, the proﬁt functions are solely dependent on ¯ w.
4.3.3 Discussion and practical relevance: Playing ﬁelds and strategies
We have two possible outcomes. If we presume that CSS will sensibly avoid to
create any long-term equilibria where it induces a loss, the possible outcomes will
range somewhere either to the left of the left-hand interior solution or to the right of
the right-hand interior solution in Figure 7. We call them the playing ﬁelds because
these settings require diﬀerent strategic considerations by the CSS-ﬁrm.
• Playing ﬁeld 1 - Monopoly:
Playing ﬁeld 1 is relevant if the CSS exists alone, i.e. while the industry rests
in the right-hand corner solution. On playing ﬁeld 1, the CSS will want to
maximize its proﬁt Π1( ¯ w) by setting ¯ w to its minimum qB. This will increase
the chances of OSS triggering.29 This danger will more or less hinder the CSS
from fully exploiting the type A programmers. The CSS needs to trade oﬀ
the proﬁt maximization against safe-guarding its monopoly.
• Playing ﬁeld 2 - Duopoly:
Playing ﬁeld 2 is relevant when the CSS and the OSS co-exist, i.e. while the
industry rests in the left-hand equilibrium. On playing ﬁeld 2, the CSS can
pursue two strategies. It can try to reach playing ﬁeld 1 again by setting a
wage higher than rA, thereby eliminating the negative gravitation ﬁeld and
thus tempting type A programmers away from the OSS. It would have to
put up with losses with this foreclosure strategy until the feat is done. This
only makes sense if the CSS expects to be compensated for these by future
monopolistic rents. Otherwise, it could accept the duopoly situation, settle
for the left-hand equilibrium and maximize its proﬁt function Π2( ¯ w).
This implies
Proposition 4 Given the other parameters render the existence of an OSS viable
in the zero-proﬁt case, the CSS - by uniformly varying the wage parameter - is not
able to inﬂuence the number of possible equilibria without incurring losses. In such
a monopoly situation the CSS can reduce the chance of a trigger event by raising its
wage, but the market is always contestable by the OSS.
Note that even if we relaxed the parameter assumptions at the start of this
section, we would ﬁnd that, for all constellations, the zero-proﬁt case minimizes the
number of equilibria. Thus, the CSS can never create a permanent situation with
less equilibria, if its wage policy remains non-discriminatory.
29In fact, in some situations the CSS may itself create the possibility of an OSS. Consider case
(a) in Figure 6. By setting its wage lower than vA, it actually grants an OSS room to maneuver
where there had been none before.
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What motivates highly skilled people to commit valuable eﬀort to an open-source
product? Indeed, they devote time and resources without being able to recoup their
personal investment by retrieving the ensuing rents. Put brieﬂy, their labor creates
a public good. Any economist would allege that private provision of a public good
should therefore generally suﬀer from under-investment. Surely, beyond altruism,
incentives to invest ought to be weakened by open access to a good. This is why
private ownership plays such a prominent role in our societies. In fact, it is a de
rigueur premise to any market-based economy.
We see institutions actually fulﬁl the function of helping investors claim their righ-
teous rents when investments create a good which is subject to free-riding, pla-
giarism or imitation. In the case of literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works,
sound records, ﬁlms, television programs as inventions, the rights of the author as
an inventor are protected by intellectual property rights, i.e. legal institutions such
as copyrights or patents respectively. The protection of intellectual property rights
is not only a matter of law but increasingly a matter of practicability as it has be-
come visible in the way that the Internet has allowed its users to breach copyrights
for sound recordings of the entertainment industries on a hitherto unknown scale.
Fact is that a record whose sold copies are freely distributed on the Internet by its
purchasers becomes a public good. Surely this would reduce the number of records
bought and consequently impede the amount of investments made in the production
of records. Which goes to show that property matters.
Generally, one would conclude that the more one is able to restrict ownership over
a good, the more rents can be reaped by its use or sale. The software industry
often establishes eﬀective property rights by technically restricting the access to the
source code or any modules of their products. The right to make alterations to the
product is reserved for designated programmers who usually only have insight into
parts of the code. For these ﬁrms, unrestricted access to their source code would
mean abandoning their property rights and would amount to economic suicide. But
that is exactly what the open source domain implies.
In the line of the above arguments, we should not observe the OSS to survive in
economic reality. Conversely, it is a true surprise that we actually do. Our model
tries to unravel this mystery. In our model, the mediocre programmers at the CSS,
who earn more than their productivity, appropriate some of the better program-
mers’ output. They actually free-ride.30 I.e. while the CSS as a whole establishes
ownership over its product, the better programmers within the CSS can only in-
completely do so over their personal contributions. On the other hand, in an OSS,
the institution as a whole exerts no property right over its product, but inside of
it fosters the establishment of individual intellectual property for its contributors.
Thus, this is what our analysis puts forth as a possible explanation for the existence
of open source systems. The driving element is that the systems diﬀer in terms of
remuneration: The CSS pays a non-discriminatory, pooling wage, whereas the OSS
by way of a separating deferred pay-oﬀ function oﬀers better programmers the pos-
sibility to set themselves apart from the less skilled and reap the equivalent of their
own product. Given this basic mechanism, we show the conditions required for a
CSS to be sustainable. In our analysis, we conclude that
1. an open-source system will never exist alone, though a closed-source system
can. The reasoning is quite simple: If high-end programmers feel a need for
diﬀerentiation, there will be low-end programmers for whom it certainly is
30See Rajan and Zingales (2000) for an excellent model of a stylized ﬁrm with unequal endow-
ments in resources between diﬀerent stake-holders and their predictions about the allocation of
property rights in such a setting.
22not advisable to choose an OSS career. If no such need is felt, then everyone
works at the CSS anyway;
2. the OSS needs a critical number of high-end programmers relative to its in-
dustry’s innovative potential in order to reach a level of quality and visibility
which makes their signals credible. Therefore, OSS becomes feasible only if
the population of high-end programmers is relatively large;
3. a well-developed mechanism to transfer the signals to the surrounding environs
is a prerequisite for OSS. The job markets must acknowledge the information
discovery service of the OSS. As such, it may be that the OSS must establish
a reputation for being a reliable signalling device;
4. provided the conditions in 2 and 3 hold, there is always a positive probability
that an OSS may come into existence. Although the CSS may reduce this
probability by strategically setting its wage, the possible emergence of an
OSS can never be totally ruled out.
In sum, our analysis shows why and how an equilibrium is viable in which both,
CSS and OSS, co-exist.
5.1 Empirical implications
To check the validity of our model, we propose that empiricists assess the following
hypotheses in our model, which allude both to underlying assumptions as well as
predictions.
1. There are ex-OSS programmers who cash in on their reputation. Their wages
are substantially higher than what the best earn at a CSS-ﬁrm.
2. There is a visible diﬀerentiation within OSS-projects as to the skills of their
programmers, e.g. a ranking or informal hierarchy.
3. There is no (established) industry in which only OSS-projects exist. Put
diﬀerently, any considerable OSS is embedded in a CSS environment.31
4. OSS-projects are not encountered in industries with low innovation. Con-
versely, they are more common in highly innovative sectors.
5. As institutional parameters like better information transfer mechanisms and
legal devices (e.g. the General Public Licence) develop, OSS-projects become
increasingly feasible.
6. The success of OSS-projects has had some inﬂuence on the remuneration pol-
icy in CSS-ﬁrms resulting either in changes in the wage level or in attempts
to imitate the selection processes of the OSS.
31The mitigating words ’established’ and ’considerable’ are deliberate. When innovative indus-
tries are in a embryonic state, small-scale OSS-projects might exist alone. Imagine a group of
scientists freely sharing their knowledge and jointly developing a completely new technology. Over
time and with more and more success of their product, the incentive to take the venture private
rises. By establishing property rights and starting to sell the technology the OSS-project becomes
a CSS-ﬁrm. The software industry as a whole has been born this way.
235.2 Analogy with academia
To back our arguments, we would like to draw a rather imperfect but nonetheless
telling analogy. Why would a successful university graduate forego years of wage
and even spend money to earn a Ph.D. degree? Little of what he produces can
be appropriated by him alone. His research is openly published and particularly
accessible to other scientists. He works in what strongly resembles an open source
environment.32 We argue that he seeks a signal to stand out from the common
mass of college graduates. Should he be successful, he creates a signal via the
academic degree which also functions on the basis of peer review and which he
hopes will materialize in some way afterwards.33 Imagine he has the choice between
a certain university U and the ﬁrm F. In F he will receive a ﬁxed wage. In U he
must pay a tuition for an opportunity to earn his Ph.D. degree. According to
our model, his choice of U will - given that F’s wage is ﬁxed - depend on the
following two considerations: Firstly, the university will have to oﬀer a promising
research environment in general, i.e. other talented scientists and Ph.D. students
in particular. They represent the reputation of U which in turn contributes to
the value of a degree earned from that university. If their number is too low, the
Ph.D. degree might prove wanting in value and later not yield a deferred pay-oﬀ
as high as desired. Secondly, if there are too many Ph.D. candidates and the level
of competition (or required quality) is very high, the challenge might appear too
tough for the aspirant. In any case, only those who think they are talented enough
will tread this path. Otherwise, they will choose F. In time, institutions such as
U may develop a reputation for screening quality, as a consequence of which vital
information transfer mechanisms (e.g. job fairs, student workshops, etc.) may evolve
and establish themselves around them. Conceivable are models of competition and
diﬀerentiation between such institutions and their environments. Our basic model
simply suggests that there should be an equilibrium number of Ph.D. students for
any such institution and the labor markets in which they are embedded.
6 Possible extensions
We believe that our model still holds some promise for research and consider sev-
eral strands along which it should be enhanced and perhaps rectiﬁed. Firstly, our
model is slightly more than simple comparative static analysis. We have implic-
itly assumed that all agents have perfect foresight about the equilibrium in which
the industry will eventually settle in. We have neglected how our interpretation
suggests that the OSS represents only a transitory stage in the career of an individ-
ual programmer wherefore the OSS should have to cope with a higher ﬂuctuation
than the CSS. In order to correct these shortcomings, one would have to build a
more dynamic model in which at each point in time a proportion of the incumbent
programmers graduates from the systems while newly arriving programmers with
imperfect knowledge and foresight decide upon their careers. As a consequence,
the model would have to incorporate expectation building and beliefs within the
framework of a fully-ﬂedged dynamic analysis. Another very important aspect is
that the programmers might face a coordination failure. If we assume once-and-for-
all career decisions without job switching, then each generation of newly arriving
programmers plays a non-repeated coordination game, the working of which has to
be explored in more depth. We say non-repeated, because it does not recur with
the same individuals, though the game itself is repeated every generation. It might
32Interestingly, there is a bi-monthly magazine for university researchers in Germany enti-
tled opensource - the network magazine for research assistants. For more information, visit
www.opensource-online.de.
33See also Franck and Jungwirth (2002, fn.18).
24be interesting to examine the possibility and eﬀect of inter-generational learning in
this context.
Secondly, we have so far not discussed the welfare aspects of the emergence of an
OSS. One could do so both from an individual as well as public perspective. It
would be especially interesting in this regard to vary the eﬀort level of the program-
mers, which in our present model is constant, and allow thereby for moral hazard.
Interesting welfare aspects would likewise be created, if we were to use synergetic in-
stead of linear production functions. One could furthermore think of the reduction
of monopoly costs, the mitigation of the public good under-investment problem,
and the fact that the programmers themselves derive utility from the usage of the
resulting product.
A further strand of analysis along this line is the inclusion of the demand side. In
the case of operating systems this is basically a battle for standards with network
eﬀects and the interesting peculiarity that one product is oﬀered for free. Many of
these welfare, competition and demand-side consequences could be modelled within
a tournament model to capture the rat race aspect of parallel development and
high-powered incentives.
A Appendix
A.1 The competition eﬀect
The following is a simple theoretical explanation for assumption 2 of the deferred
pay-oﬀ function. Imagine
1. there are n programmers of the same type (productivity).
2. there is a total of m known problems to be solved.
3. a programmer can only work on one problem at a time.
4. only one solution is implemented in the actual product. I.e. if several pro-
grammers oﬀer diﬀerent solutions for the same problem, only one gets chosen.
This is the ”winner-takes-it-all” principle.
5. the programmer whose solution is implemented can henceforth credibly signal
his productivity, because the open source makes the programmers’ individual
contributions transparent.
As long as n ≤ m , each programmer may work on a problem alone. Competition
can be avoided. Once n ≥ m, at least some programmers are bound to contend
over the same problem. On average, there will be
x =
n
m
programmers working on one problem. If we assume that every programmer has
the same chance of winning the signal, then the expected value for each of them is
E[ri] = prob(x) · qi
where prob(x) is the individual probability of success given a number of x competi-
tors and qi is the certainty value of the signal. The chances being evenly distributed,
prob(x) is deﬁned as
prob(x) =
1
x
25Substituting the equations into each other yields
E[ri] =
m
n
· qi
Clearly,
∂E[ri]
∂n
< 0
and
limE[ri] = 0 as n → ∞
A.2 Derivation of the deferred pay-oﬀ function
To approximate the deferred pay-oﬀ function for type A, we use a quadratic function
of the form
rA(α) = −c · (α − αmax)2 + rmax
where c, αmax and rmax are the unknown parameters. From our assumptions, the
following conditions can be postulated:
rmax = vA
rA(1) = 0
rA(1 −
k
nA
) = 0
This system is determined as we have three independent equations for three
unknown parameters. From this we get
rA(α) = −
4n2
AvA
k2
A
[α − (1 −
kA
2nA
)]2 + vA
The procedure for type B is analogous.
A.3 Proof of lemma 5
The intercept of the wage function is always qB which at the same time is its
minimum value (see ﬁgure 4). The intercept of the deferred pay-oﬀ function varies
dependent on nA
kA . We will look at the diﬀerence function of type A with vA = qA.
For α = 0, we get
∆A(0) = (qB − qA) +
4n2
AqA
k2
A
· (1 −
ka
2nA
)2.
Rearranging this leads to
∆A(0) =
4n2
AqA
k2
A
−
4nAqA
kA
+ qB. (A.1)
In the limits ∆A(0) behaves as follows
∆A(0) = qB > 0 as
nA
ka
→ 0
∆A(0) = ∞ > 0 as
nA
ka
→ ∞
∆A(0) = qB − qA < 0 as
nA
ka
→
1
2
26Since this is positive for the corner values of nA
kA and negative for a value inside
this range, being monotonous the diﬀerence function must have two roots for α = 0
dependent on nA
kA . Figure 8 shows us its behavior for a steadily increasing nA
kA . The
sequence is to be viewed from left to right and top down. Note that the sign of
∆(0) changes in (b) and (d).
- - -
6 6 6
- -
6 6
α α α
α α
w, r w, r w, r
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w w w
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Figure 8: The eﬀect of a changing nA
kA
It should also be noted that in
• (a) there is no intersection
• (c) there is one intersection
• (e) there are two intersections
between the wage and the deferred pay-oﬀ function. Thus (b) and (d) with ∆A(0) =
0 mark not only the change of the sign of ∆A(0), but also the changes in the number
of intersections between the two underlying functions. Next, we calculate the exact
level of nA
kA in (b) and (d). For this, we set ∆A(0) to zero in equation A.1 which
after some rearranging gives us
z2 − 2z +
qB
qA
= 0 with z =
2nA
k
Solving this quadratic equation for z yields the following solutions for nA
kA
nA
kA
=
1
2
· [1 ±
r
1 −
qB
qA
].
Since the term under the root is between zero and one, we get two positive and
therefore viable solutions.
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